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Thanks to Rik Peels for his thought-provoking comments which give me the opportunity to 
say more about the arguments and rationale of my article and the integrated conception. 
 
1. General Remarks About Two Approaches to Ignorance  
 
Rik Peels’ and Patrick Bondy’s replies allow me to highlight and distinguish two approaches 
to ignorance, one that focuses on ignorance as a simple doxastic (propositional) 
phenomenon and another that regards ignorance as a complex epistemological phenomenon 
that is constituted by a doxastic component and by other epistemic components. The 
distinction can be illustrated by Peels’ conception and my integrated conception of ignorance 
proposed in the article. Peels’ conception belongs with the first approach, my conception 
belongs with the second approach.  
 
As Peels’ reply also evinces, the two approaches come with different assumptions and 
consequences. For example, the first approach presupposes that accounts of knowledge and 
ignorance are symmetrical and/or mirror each other and, consequently, it will expect that an 
account of ignorance has the same features as an account of knowledge.  
 
In contrast, the second approach takes ignorance to be a topic in its own right and therefore 
it is not concerned by criticism that points out that its account of ignorance makes claims 
that an account of knowledge does not make or does not fit with an account of knowledge 
in other ways. I will return to this distinction later. A major concern of the second approach 
(and my conception shares this concern) is to develop an account of ignorance sui generis, 
not an account of ignorance in the light of knowledge (or accounts of knowledge). 
 
2. Why Peels’ attempt at reducing the integrated conception to his view fails 
 
Peels argues that the integrated conception of ignorance boils down to the conception of 
ignorance that he endorses. However, if I understand his considerations and arguments 
correctly, the observations can either be accommodated by my conception or my conception 
can give reasons for rejecting Peels’ assumptions. Let me discuss the three central steps in 
turn. 
 
2.1. Doxastic Attitudes in the Second Conjunct 
 
As a first step Peels notes that “the reference to doxastic attitudes in the second conjunct is 
… redundant” (Peels 2019, 11) since holding a false belief or holding no belief, the 
manifestations of ignorance, just are doxastic attitudes. But the doxastic attitudes in the 
second conjunct are not redundant because they capture second-order (and in general 
higher-order) attitudes towards ignorance, e.g. I am ignorant of the rules of Japanese 
grammar and I (truly) believe that I do not know these rules.  
 
Socratic ignorance also includes more doxastic attitudes than those at the first level of 
ignorance. Those doxastic attitudes can also constitute ignorance. Peels’ observation 
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indicates that it might be advisable for me to talk of meta-attitudes rather than doxastic 
attitudes to avoid confusion about the double appearance of doxastic attitudes.  
 
2.2. Epistemic Virtues and Vices and the Nature of Ignorance 
 
Peels’ second step concerns the other two components of the second conjunct. Epistemic 
virtues and vices “[do] not belong to the essence of being ignorant” (Peels 2019, 11). But I 
do not see what reasons Peels has for this claim. My arguments for saying that they do 
belong to the nature of being ignorant from the original article are still valid. One does not 
capture ignorance by focusing only on the doxastic component.  
 
This is what my example of Kate and Hannah who are ignorant of the fact that cruise ships 
produce high emissions of carbon and sulfur dioxides but have different epistemic attitudes 
towards not knowing this fact and thus are ignorant in different ways is meant to show. 
Their being ignorant is not just determined by the doxastic component but also by their 
attitudes.  
 
This does not mean that all ignorance comes with closed-mindedness or open-mindedness, 
it just means that all states of ignorance are constituted by a doxastic component and an 
attitudinal component (whichever attitudes fills that spot and whether it is implicit or explicit 
is an open question and depends on the relevant instance of ignorance). I am interested to 
hear which additional reasons Peels has for cutting epistemic virtues and vices from the 
second conjunct and delineating the nature of ignorance in the way that he does.  
 
2.3. Ignorance as a Disposition?  
 
Peels’ third step consists in a number of questions about ignorance as a disposition. He 
writes: 
 
“[O]n the El Kassar synthesis, ignorance is a disposition that manifests itself in a 
number of dispositions (beliefs, lack of belief, virtues, vices). What sort of thing is 
ignorance if it is a disposition to manifest certain dispositions? It seems if one is disposed to 
manifest certain dispositions, one simply has those dispositions and will, therefore, 
manifest them in the relevant circumstances.” (Peels 2019, 12, emphasis in original).  
 
These questions seem to indicate to Peels that the dispositional character of ignorance on 
the integrated conception is unclear and therefore disposition may be removed from the 
integrated conception. It does not make sense to say that ignorance is a disposition.  
 
But Peels’ questions and conclusion themselves invite a number of questions and, therefore, 
I do not see how anything problematic follows for my conception. It is not clear to me 
whether Peels is worried because my conception implies that a disposition is manifested in 
another disposition that may be manifested or not, or whether he is concerned because my 
conception implies that one disposition (in the present context: ignorance) may have 
different stimulus conditions and different manifestations.  
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In reply to the first worry I can confirm that I think that it is possible that a disposition can 
be manifested in other dispositions. But I do not see why this is a problem. An example may 
help undergird my claim. Think e.g. of the disposition to act courageously, it is constituted at 
minimum by the disposition to take action when necessary and to feel as is appropriate. 
Aristotle’s description of the courageous person reveals how complicated the virtue is and 
that it consists in a number of dispositions:  
 
Now the brave man is as dauntless as man may be. Therefore, while he will fear even 
the things that are not beyond human strength, he will fear them as he ought and as 
reason directs, and he will face them for the sake of what is noble; for this is the end 
of excellence. But it is possible to fear these more, or less, and again to fear things 
that are not terrible as if they were.  
 
Of the faults that are committed one consists in fearing what one should not, 
another in fearing as we should not, another in fearing when we should not, and so 
on; and so too with respect to the things that inspire confidence. The man, then, 
who faces and who fears the right things and with the right aim, in the right way and 
at the right time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions, is 
brave; for the brave man feels and acts according to the merits of the case and in 
whatever way reason directs. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1115b 17-22)  
 
The fact that courage consists in other dispositions also explains why there are many ways to 
not be virtuously courageous. For the present context all that matters is that a disposition 
can consist in other dispositions that can be manifested or not. 
 
The second worry might be alleviated by introducing the notion of multi-track dispositions 
into my argument. A multi-track disposition, a term widely acknowledged in philosophical 
work on disposition, is individuated by several pairs of stimulus conditions and 
manifestations (Vetter 2015, 34). Thus, ignorance as a disposition may be spelled out as a 
multi-track disposition that has different stimulus conditions and different manifestations.  
 
Peels also argues against the view that epistemic virtues themselves are manifestations of 
ignorance. But I do not hold that epistemic virtues simpliciter are manifestations of 
ignorance, rather I submit that epistemic virtues (or vices) necessarily appear in 
manifestations of ignorance, they co-constitute ignorance.  
 
Enveloped in Peels’ argument is another objection, namely, that epistemic virtues cannot 
appear in manifestations of ignorance, it is only epistemic vices that can be manifestations of 
ignorance – or as I would say: can appear in manifestations of ignorance. Peels claims that, 
“open-mindedness, thoroughness, and intellectual perseverance are clearly not manifestations 
of ignorance. If anything, they are the opposite: manifestations of knowledge, insight and 
understanding.” (Peels 2019, 12, emphasis in original) 
 
Let me address this concern by explaining how ignorance can be related to epistemic virtues. 
Being open-mindedly ignorant, and being ignorant in an intellectually persevering way 
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become more plausible forms and instantiations of ignorance if one recognizes the 
significance of ignorance in scientific research. Think, e.g., of a scientist who wants to find 
out how Earth was formed does not know how Earth was formed and she may dedicate her 
whole life to answering that question and will persist in the face of challenges and setbacks.  
 
Similarly, for a scientist who wants to improve existing therapies for cancer and sets out to 
develop nanotechnological devices to support clinicians. She can be open-mindedly ignorant 
about the details of the new device. In fact, most scientists are probably open-mindedly 
ignorant; they do want to know more about what it is they do not know in their field and are 
after more evidence and insights. That is also one reason for conducting experiments etc. 
Firestein (2012) and several contributions in Gross and McGoey’s Routledge Handbook of 
Ignorance Studies (2015) discuss this connection in more detail.  
 
Thus, Peels’ third step also does not succeed and as it stands the integrated conception thus 
does not reduce to Peels’ view. But I’d be interested to hear more about why such a revision 
of the integrated conception suggests itself.  
 
3. Correction Concerning “How One Is Ignorant”  
 
Let me address a cause of confusion in the integrated conception. When I call for an account 
of ignorance to explain “how one is ignorant”, I do not want the account to explain how one 
has become ignorant, i.e. provide a genetic or causal story of a particular state of ignorance. 
This assumption leads Peels and Bondy to their objections concerning causal components in 
my conception of the nature of ignorance.  
 
Instead, what I require, is for an account of ignorance to capture what one’s ignorance is 
like, what epistemic attitudes the subject has towards the doxastic component of her 
ignorance. The confusion and the fundamental objections to the integrated conceptionmay 
be explained by the different approaches of ignorance that I have mentioned at the start of 
my reply. 
 
4. No Mirroring Nor Symmetry Required 
 
Peels notes that theories of knowledge do not include a causal story of how the subject 
became knowledgeable, nor about the quality of the subject’s knowledge, and from this he 
concludes that the integrated conception of ignorance which he takes to provide such a 
causal story must be rejected. However, as it stands, his argument is not conclusive.  
 
First, it builds on confusion about the claims of the integrated conception that I have 
addressed in the previous section (3): the integrated conception does not provide a causal 
story for how the subject became ignorant, nor does it claim that such a causal story should 
be part of an account of the nature of ignorance. Rather, it spells out which additional 
features of ignorance are also constitutive – namely, an epistemic attitude – in addition to the 
doxastic component accepted by everyone.  
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Second, it is unclear why theories of knowledge and theories of ignorance have to 
presuppose a current-time slice approach, as effectively endorsed by Peels. Some theories of 
knowledge want to distinguish lucky true belief from knowledge and therefore look at the 
causal history of the subject coming to their true belief and therefore reject current-time slice 
approaches (e.g. Goldman 2012).  
 
Third, Peels’ objection presupposes that theories of knowledge and theories of ignorance 
have to contain the same constituents and features or have to be symmetrical or have to 
mirror each other in some way, but I do not see why these presuppositions hold. Knowledge 
and ignorance are obviously intimately connected but I am curious to hear further arguments 
for why their accounts have to be unified or symmetrical or mirrored.  
 
5. The Distinction Between Necessary and Contingent or Accidental Features of 
Ignorance  
 
Peels argues that my conception confuses necessary and contingent or accidental features of 
ignorance but it is not clear what reasons Peels can give to support his diagnosis. My 
conception specifically distinguishes necessary components of ignorance and 
contingent/accidental instantiations of a necessary component of ignorance.  
 
Peels’ discussion of my example of Kate and Hannah who both do not know that cruise 
ships have bad effects for the environment seems to jumble necessary features of ignorance 
whose instantiation is contingent (e.g. open-mindedness instantiates the epistemic attitude-
component in open-minded ignorance) and contingent features of ignorance that trace back 
the causal history of an instance of ignorance. Peels writes:  
 
Hannah is deeply and willingly ignorant about the high emissions of both carbon and 
sulfur dioxides of cruise ships (I recently found out that a single cruise trip has 
roughly the same amount of emission as seven million cars in an average year 
combined). Kate is much more open-minded, but has simply never considered the 
issue in any detail. She is in a state of suspending ignorance regarding the emission of 
cruise ships.  
 
I reply that they are both ignorant, at least propositionally ignorant, but that their 
ignorance has different, contingent features: Hannah’s ignorance is deep ignorance, 
Kate’s ignorance is suspending ignorance, Hannah’s ignorance is willing or 
intentional, Kate’s ignorance is not. These are among the contingent features of 
ignorance; both are ignorant and, therefore, meet the criteria that I laid out for the 
nature of ignorance. (Peels 2019, 16-17) 
 
Hannah’s and Kate’s particular epistemic attitudes are (to some extent) contingent but the 
fact that ignorance consists in a doxastic component and an attitudinal component is not 
contingent but necessary. In other words: which epistemic attitude is instantiated is 
accidental, but that there is an epistemic attitude present is not accidental but necessary. That 
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is what the integrated conception holds. I’m interested to hear more about Peels’ argument 
for the opposing claim in the light of these clarifications. 
 
6. Being Constitutive and Being Causal 
 
Peels’ argumentation seems to presuppose that something that is constitutive of a state or 
disposition cannot also be causal, but it is not clear why that should be the case. E.g. Elzinga 
(2018) argues that epistemic self-confidence is constitutive of intellectual autonomy and at 
the same time may causally contribute to intellectual autonomy.  
 
And note also that a constitutive relation between dispositions does not have to entail a 
causal relation in the sense of an efficient cause. Some authors in Action Theory argue that a 
disposition is not the cause of an action; rather, a decision, motivation, desire (etc.) is the 
cause of the action (cf. Löwenstein 2017, 85-86). I do not want to take sides on this issue, 
this is just to point out that Peels’ approach to something being constitutive and being a 
cause is not straightforward. (See also Section 4 in my upcoming reply to Patrick Bondy.) 
 
7. Other Forms of Ignorance  
 
Peels notes that my approach does not capture objectual and procedural ignorance as spelled 
out by Nottelmann (e.g. Nottelmann 2016). He tries to show that the integrated conception 
does not work for lack of know-how: “not knowing how to ride a bike does not seem to 
come with certain intellectual virtues or vices” (Peels 2019, 13) nor for lack of objectual 
ignorance: “if I am not familiar with the smell of fresh raspberries, that does not imply any 
false beliefs or absence of beliefs, nor does it come with intellectual virtues or vices” (Peels 
2019, 13).  
 
I am glad that Peels picks out this gap in the article, as does Bondy. It is an important and 
stimulating open question how the integrated conception fits with such other forms of 
ignorance – I am open-mindedly ignorant with respect to its answers. But the article did not 
set out to give an all-encompassing account of ignorance. Nor is it clear, whether one 
account will work for all forms of ignorance (viz. propositional ignorance, objectual 
ignorance, technical/procedural ignorance). Peels’ observation thus highlights an important 
open question for all theories of ignorance but not a particular objection against my 
integrated conception.  
 
At the same time, I am skeptical whether Peels’ proposed account, the threefold synthesis, 
succeeds at capturing objectual and procedural ignorance. I do not see how the threefold 
synthesis is informative regarding objectual and procedural ignorance since it just states that 
objectual ignorance is “lack of objectual knowledge” and procedural ignorance is “lack of 
procedural knowledge”. Peels’ formulates the Threefold Synthesis as follows, with an 
additional footnote: 
 
Threefold Synthesis: Ignorance is an epistemic agent’s lack of propositional 
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knowledge or lack of true belief, lack of objectual knowledge, or lack of procedural 
knowledge.9 
9If the Standard View on Ignorance is correct, then one could simply replace this 
with: Ignorance is a disposition of an epistemic agent that manifests itself in lack of 
(propositional, objectual, or procedural) knowledge. (Peels 2019, 13) 
 
I do not see how these statements go toward capturing lack of competence, e.g. not possessing 
the competence to ski, or lack of objectual knowledge, e.g. not knowing Paris. I guess that 
philosophers interested in ignorance and in this issue will have to carefully study the 
phenomena that they want to capture and their interrelations – as Bondy starts to do in his 
Reply (Bondy 2018, 12-14) – in order to set out to adequately capture what Peels calls lack of 
objectual knowledge or lack of procedural knowledge.  
 
8. What Does One Want From an Account of Ignorance? 
 
Peels’ reply evinces that anyone who wants to develop an account of ignorance needs to 
answer a number of fundamental questions, including: What is it that we want from an 
account of ignorance? Do we want it a unified account for knowledge and ignorance? Do we 
want a simple account? Or do we want to adequately capture the phenomenon and be able 
to explain its significance in epistemic practices of epistemic agents? I want the account to be 
able to do the latter and have therefore put forward the integrated conception. 
 
9. Two Clarificatory Remarks  
 
In closing, I would like to add two clarificatory remarks. Peels suggests that the structural 
conception and agnotology are identical conceptions or approaches (Peels 2019, 15-16). But 
even though there are signficant connections between the structural conception and 
agnotology, they are distinct.  
 
The examples for the structural conception in my article are from feminist epistemology of 
ignorance, not from agnotology. I do not want to engage in labelling and including or 
excluding authors and their works from fields and disciplines, but there are differences 
between works in epistemology of ignorance and agnotology since agnotology is often taken 
to belong with history of science. I would not want to simply identify them. 
 
I do not see how Peels’ observations that the examples for agential conceptions of ignorance 
include causal language and that the conception of ignorance that he finds in critical race 
theory does not fit with someone being ignorant “of the fact that Antarctica is the largest 
desert on earth” (Peels 2019, 14) present objections to the integrated conception.  
 
If there are claims about the causes of ignorance in these theories, that does not mean that 
my conception, which is distinct from these conceptions, makes the same claims. I 
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specifically develop a new conception because of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different conceptions that I discuss in the article.1 
 
Contact details: nadja.elkassar@gess.ethz.ch 
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